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MAKING IT A FEDERAL ISSUE:
THE UNJUSTIFIABLE EXPANSION OF
FEDERAL COMMON LAW TO CORPORATE
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
STEPHANIE

A. ROTTERt

INTRODUCTION

One of the most established principles of Supreme Court
jurisprudence is that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the state .... There is no federal general
common law."' Nonetheless, the question of whether to apply
federal common law has resurfaced in the context of corporate
successor liability under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or
"Superfund" or the "Act").2 CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to
combat "the serious environmental and health risks posed by
industrial pollution."3 The statute authorizes the President to
finance cleanup efforts from the "Hazardous Substance
Superfund"4 ("Superfund" or the "Fund") upon satisfaction of
t Associate Managing Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2009, St.
John's University School of Law; B.S., 2006, The Peter J. Tobin College of Business,
St. John's University.
1 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The Supreme Court has
since identified a few specific areas of the law in which it can articulate substantive
rules of decision that have the force of federal law, such as interstate and
international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of states or relations with
foreign nations, admiralty cases, and some matters involving Indian tribes. See
Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 507 (2006).
2 See Philip G. Watson, Note, United States v. General Battery Corp.: The Third
Circuit Applies Federal Common Law Rather than State Law To Determine
Successor Liability Under CERCLA, Despite Opposing Result in Other Circuits-But
Are the Splitting Circuits Really Just Splitting Hairs?,20 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 219, 22226 (2006).
1 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998).
4 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2000). The term "Superfund" is often used to refer generally
to the environmental program established to address abandoned hazardous waste
sites, as well as the name of the fund established by CERCLA. See U.S. Envtl. Prot.
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certain statutory conditions.5 Presidential action is typically
taken through the Environmental Protection Agency (the
"EPA"),6 by a delegation of executive power also authorized
within the Act.7 Expenditures from the Fund may be recovered
through actions permitted against four categories of potentially
responsible parties, including "any person who at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility."' The Act also provides for cleanup liability not involving
expenditures from the Fund, such as recovery of "necessary
costs" of response incurred by any person and damages for injury,
destruction, or loss of natural resources. 9
The circuit courts are unanimously of the opinion that
successor liability exists under CERCLA for those situations in
which a corporation has passed through one or more hands of
ownership or operation since the act giving rise to the liability
occurred.' As a preliminary matter, CERCLA recovery actions
may be brought against corporations in general because section
9601 of the Act includes corporations and other business entities
within the definition of "person." " Moreover, federal statutory
law generally defines "company" or "association" used in
12
reference to a corporation to include successors and assigns.
Read together, these provisions arguably implicitly recognize the
existence of successor liability under the Act.1 3 Implicit is the
Agency, Superfund: Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm
(last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
' See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2000 & Supp. V); see also Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 55.
6 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, About EPA, http://www.epa.gov/epahome/about
epa.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2009); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Superfund: Basic
Information, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (2000).
8 Id. § 9607(a)(2).
9 Id. § 9607(a)(4). See generally id. § 9613(g) (listing types of actions that may be
brought under the Act).
lOUnited States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005)
(discussing the unanimous recognition of successor liability under CERCLA among
the courts of appeals).
" 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) ("The term 'person' means an individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity,
United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of
a State, or any interstate body.").
12 1 U.S.C. § 5 ("The word 'company' or 'association', when used in reference to a
corporation, shall be deemed to embrace the words 'successors and assigns of such
company or association', in like manner as if these last-named words, or words of
similar import, were expressed.").
13 See Watson, supra note 2, at 221.
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operative word fueling the choice of law debate. Can successor
liability-never directly addressed in the statute-be excepted
from the general principle that the state law typically prevails?
Some courts have looked to a test established by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 14 to decide
whether to resort to a uniform federal standard.1 5 The test is
comprised of three considerations: (1) whether the nature of the
federal program requires uniformity; (2) whether the application
of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal
program; and (3) the extent to which the application of a federal
rule would disrupt commercial relationships based on state law.1 6
The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that a uniform
standard may never be required in this particular context,
further confounding an already complicated circuit split. In
United States v. Bestfoods,"7 the Court made statements in dicta
that cast serious doubt on any contention that federal common
law should govern in cases to determine corporate successor
liability in CERCLA actions."
Still, those dicta statements have not reconciled the
diverging approaches taken by different circuit courts. Some
circuit courts have maintained that federal law should apply.
Most recently, in United States v. General Battery Corporation,
Inc.,19 the Third Circuit reaffirmed its prior holding that
CERCLA required application of a uniform federal standard to
determine corporate successor liability despite any contrary
holdings in other circuits and the possible contrary Supreme
Court treatment of the issue. 20 The Supreme Court subsequently
14

440 U.S. 715 (1979).

15 See

New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 2006);
General Battery, 423 F.3d at 299, 303-04; United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 53 (1st
Cir. 2001); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d
358, 363 (9th Cir. 1997).
16 See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29.
17 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
18 See id. at 63 ("CERCLA is thus like many another congressional enactment in
giving no indication that 'the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced
simply because a plaintiffs cause of action is based upon a federal statute'...."
(quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979))).
19 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005).
20 See id. at 298, 300 (discussing prior holdings and stating that the validity of
those holdings had not been undermined by recent Supreme Court decisions). But
see id. at 309 (Rendell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
the determination that CERCLA corporate successor liability must be controlled by
federal common law runs contrary to recent Supreme Court pronouncements).
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declined to hear the case.21 Some circuits have shown no
intention or movement to disturb prior holdings. For example,
the latest decision from the Fourth Circuit applied federal
common law in a CERCLA corporate successor liability case.22
Other circuits, however, have insisted that there is no reason to
depart from the application of state law-in decisions that arose
both before and after Bestfoods.23 Given the variance in the
resolution of this issue across circuits and the refusal of the
Supreme Court to review the Third Circuit decision that
espouses what may now be considered an unpopular view, there
is bound to be continued confusion over what law should apply in
cases involving corporate successor liability under CERCLA.
Part I of this Note explores the background of CERCLA
liability, including the history and purposes of the statute, and
further identifies the ambiguity in the statutory language. Part
II discusses the controlling principles regarding application of
federal common law and the extent to which different courts have
followed those principles in this context. Part III introduces
21 Exide Techs. v. United States, 549 U.S. 941 (2006) (denying petition for writ
of certiorari).
22 See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir.
1992). The Eighth Circuit also seems to weigh in favor of applying a uniform federal
standard despite Bestfoods. See United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d
478, 487 n.9 (8th Cir. 1992) (declining to decide whether federal or state law should
apply but stating that the district court was "probably correct" in applying federal
law); see also K.C. 1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1022 (8th Cir.
2007) (concluding that the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Bestfoods did not
directly address corporate successor liability, and therefore, does not completely
disturb its prior holding).
23 See United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (endorsing prior
conclusion that the majority rule is to apply state law when there is no conflict with
the federal interests behind CERCLA and recognizing that there would be no
frustration of federal objectives by applying state law to the facts of the case);
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 364
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that there is no evidence that the application of state
corporation law would frustrate the objectives of CERCLA because it is "unrealistic
to think that a state would alter general corporate law principles to become a
peculiarly hospitable haven for polluters"); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland
Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1502 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding that federal law
governing liability under CERCLA should incorporate the applicable state rule for
determining limited partner liability); City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d
244, 250 (6th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that the liability of a successor corporation
under CERCLA is determined by state law); see also New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus.,
Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to decide whether CERCLA
requires the displacement of state law but failing to see any conflict between
applying state law and the relevant federal interests).
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different theories of corporate successor liability and their
relationship to both state and federal common law. Part IV of
this Note determines the viability of the competing interests that
are at play on either side and suggests whether state or federal
common law should be applied to determine successor liability in
CERCLA actions.
I.

CERCLA: STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND CONSTRUCTION

Since its enactment on December 11, 1980,24 CERCLA has
been met with opposition from interest groups and individual
corporations in Congress, the federal courts, and within the
bureaucracy.25 The opposition is not surprising considering the
enormous exposure to liability that the Act creates for American
businesses, many of which have spent decades improperly
disposing of hazardous waste and contaminating tens of
thousands of sites across the country.2 6 The $550 million in
private party funding commitments secured by the EPA during
its fiscal year 2006 through agreements of potentially responsible
parties to conduct $391 million in future response work and to
reimburse EPA for $164 million in past costs is a clear
illustration of the heavy liability costs that businesses face.27
Potentially liable corporations will presumably look for
ambiguity in CERCLA as a way out, with seemingly good odds of
success.

24 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, CERCLA Overview, http://www.epa.gov/super
fund/policy/cercla.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
25

See SHELDON

KAMIENIECKI,

CORPORATE

AMERICA AND

ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY 44 (2006) (listing the potential forums for battles over environmental
regulations and noting that various industrial sectors led an attack on CERCLA
during the Reagan administration). General Electric has been involved in an

ongoing battle with the EPA over whether it should be forced to remove PCBs from
the Hudson River under the Natural Resource Damages provisions of CERCLA. See
id. at 145. The disagreement began in 1980 and continued until the EPA and GE
finally reached an agreement on an abatement plan for the Hudson River in 2003-a
period marked by aggressive and expensive campaigning by GE. See id. at 145-51.
The PCB contamination of the Hudson River, with abatement costs predicted at
hundreds of millions of dollars, represents the most expensive Superfund site in the
nation. Id. at 145.
26 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Region 2 Superfund, http://www.epa.gov/region
02/superfund/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
27 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Superfund National Accomplishments Summary

Fiscal Year 2006, http://www.epa.gov/superf-md/accomp/numbers06.htm (last visited
Jan. 21, 2009).
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Setting the Scene for CERCLA: History and Purpose

CERCLA's legislative history does not provide definitive
answers to many questions of interpretation that have surfaced
since the legislation was passed. 2 A prime example of "eleventhhour" legislation, the Act was passed in haste as a compromise
bill without any House-Senate conference report.29 The broad
goals of CERCLA, however, can be discerned from the face of the
Act. 30
It seeks "[t]o establish a comprehensive federal-state
mechanism for [efficient] response to releases or threatened
releases ... of hazardous substances at facilities that.., are not
owned or operated by [a party] financially capable or willing to
undertake appropriate response action."31
The Act also
establishes a federal trust fund to pay the response costs of
government agencies or private volunteers as well as the costs of
natural resource damage assessment and restoration.3 2 CERCLA
further establishes a federal cause of action against certain
responsible parties for recovery of costs incurred in response to
hazardous substance releases.33 An overriding objective of the
Act is that responsible parties ultimately bear the costs of
cleanup and pay for damages to natural resources. 4
While the common law had allowed private individuals to
enjoin others from harming their land and permitted recovery of
damages for injury to private land, it did not adequately protect
public resources.3 5 The government, therefore, lacked the broad
28

See BRADFORD F. WHITMAN, SUPERFUND LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.03(c), at 13

(1991).
29 See id. CERCLA was derived from basic provisions contained in three bills:
(1) H.R. 85, The Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act;
(2) H.R. 7020, the Hazardous Waste Containment Act of 1980; and (3) S. 1480, the
Environmental Emergency Response Act. See VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, HAZARDOUS
WASTE CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND LITIGATION 7 (1992). The resultant draft was then
passed by a lame duck Congress before its adjournment. See id. at 5.
30 WHITMAN, supra note 28, at 14.
11Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
32 WHITMAN,
supra note 28, at 14; see also 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2000);
42 U.S.C. § 9611.
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); WHITMAN, supra note 28, at 14.
34 KEVIN M. WARD & JOHN W. DUFFIELD, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: LAW

AND ECONOMICS 80 (1992).

-" See Frederick R. Anderson, Natural Resource Damages, Superfund, and the
Courts, in VALUING NATURAL ASSETS: THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 26, 26 (Raymond J. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith eds., 1993). This
is true despite the doctrines of public trust and parens patriae, which contained
limitations to the categories of natural resources protected and the standing of a
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power it needed to recover damages for injury to public natural
resources. 6 The discovery of abandoned hazardous waste sites in
the late 1970s, coupled with the governmental realization that no
scheme was in place to correct future problems arising from these
sites, prompted a call for federal action.
CERCLA was thus a
"response to the serious environmental and health risks posed by
industrial pollution,"" through which "Congress created the first
federal and state resources trustees and empowered them to seek
damages for injuries to public natural resources caused by toxic
wastes."39
The hazardous waste sites that the Act seeks to clean and
redevelop are commonly called "Superfund sites," and there is at
least one Superfund site in every state.4" On the Act's twentyfifth anniversary in December 2005, the EPA claimed to have
completed work at sixty-two percent of the Superfund private
and federal sites then in existence and to have work in progress

state to assert claims, See generally WARD & DUFFIELD, supra note 34, at 11-23
(discussing general principles of and exceptions to public trust and parens patriae
doctrines). Even in suits brought by private individuals, the common law presented
problems of proving liability, particularly against previous owners. See Note,
Development in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1602,
1624-27 (1986). Specifically, the lack of sufficient records and the generic nature of
many toxic substances made it very difficult for a plaintiff to meet the legal
causation burden of identifying a specific defendant who could be held responsible as
the source of the substance causing the injury. See id.
36 See Note, supra note 35.
37 Martina E. Cartwright, Superfund: It's No Longer Super and It Isn't Much of
a Fund, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 302 (2005). The most famous discovery of this time
occurred in 1978, when approximately 80,000 tons of toxic wastes were discovered in
Love Canal, New York. See, e.g., WARD & DUFFIELD, supra note 34, at 1. The
"sensationalistic" national media coverage of this event was the most obvious
catalyst of political action. See JOEL S. MOSKOWITZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND
REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS 3-4 (2d ed. 1995).
31 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998). But see Bruce Yandle,
Superfund and Risky Risk Reduction, in CUTTING GREEN TAPE: Toxic POLLUTANTS,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE LAW 27, 46 (Richard L. Stroup & Roger E.
Meiners eds., 2000) ("The program is basically about finding revenues, no matter
how, for the purpose of addressing emotional concerns about risks that can be quite
small. The program is also about emergency cleanups of truly hazardous waste
sites.").
" See Anderson, supra note 35, at 27.
' U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Superfund's 25th Anniversary: Capturing the Past,
Charting the Future, http:/www.epa.gov/superfund/25anniversary/index.htm (last
visited Jan. 21, 2009). The Act is often referred to as "Superfund" or as having
created the "Superfund program." See id.
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at an additional 422 sites.4 ' Despite this apparent success,
approximately one out of every four Americans at the time was
living within four miles of a Superfund site.4 2 This leads to
serious public concerns, as assessment of potentially hazardous
waste sites may reveal previously unknown chemicals and
wastes that require research and new technologies to combat
possible threats posed to human life and the environment.4 3
The Superfund cleanup process is long and complex, and
usually begins with a site discovery or notification to the EPA of
a possible release of hazardous substances. 4 It then follows a
number of steps that ultimately end in site redevelopment. 5 One
of the earliest and most pivotal steps in the cleanup process is
the placement of a site on the National Priorities List-"[a] list of
the most serious sites [that have been] identified for possible
long-term cleanup. 46 The result of this long process is ideally a
cleaner, safer environment, but the efforts to decrease the
dangers presented by toxic materials also result in liabilities
facing citizens estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars.
CERCLA retroactively imposes this liability for activities that
may have taken place decades before and, in many cases, the
corporate entity that engaged in the initially harmful activity
either exists in a different form or no longer exists at all. 48 The
41 Id. Superfund also employs an emergency response program that has been
put to use at thousands of sites to reduce immediate threats to human health,
including the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks, the 2001 Anthrax Attacks,
the Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Id.
42

Id.
43 Id.
44 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Cleanup Process, http://www.epa.gov/super

fund/cleanup/index.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
45 See id. Through Superfund's Redevelopment Initiative, Superfund sites have
transformed into model airplane fields, airports, major department stores, soccer
fields, golf courses, and wildlife refuges, among others. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Superfund's 25th Anniversary: Capturing the Past, Charting the Future,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/25anniversary/index.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
46 See Cleanup Process, supra note 44.
47 See Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners, The Toxic Liability Problem: Why
Is It Too Large?, in CUTTING GREEN TAPE: Toxic POLLUTANTS, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 1, 5. The relevant study estimated that
remedying existing hazardous waste problems over a period of thirty years would
cost approximately $750 billion in resources. Id. at 6. The estimate accounts for
remediation under three federal programs, one of which being Superfund sites on
the National Priority List. See id.
4'See Alicia C. Rood, CERCLA Successor Liability: Theories of Liability,
FINDLAW, June 1, 1997, http://library.fmdlaw.com/1997/Jun/l/127681.html.
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government or private party seeking to allocate or recover the
costs of remediation may then attempt to impose the liability on
a successor corporation.4 9
B.

CERCLA Breakdown: Not "a Model of Legislative
Draftsmanship"

It is well recognized that CERCLA is not "a model of
legislative draftsmanship. 5 °
If CERCLA itself provided a
standard for determining corporate successor liability-or
squarely addressed the issue at all-there would be no cause for
this inquiry. The statute, however, is organized in a complex and
confusing manner, leaving questions open as to whether
successor liability exists under the Act and, if so, how it should
be determined.
CERCLA authorizes the President, who in turn typically
delegates the power to act to the EPA,51 to initiate removal of
hazardous substances or to take other measures that the
President deems necessary to protect the public health or the
environment.5 2 Such action is permitted whenever a hazardous
substance or a pollutant or contaminant posing "imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or welfare" is released or
when there is a substantial threat of such a release into the
environment. 3 The financing of the expenditures related to the
cleanup may be initially taken from the "Hazardous Substance
Superfund. ' 54 The financing costs then may be recovered
through a CERCLA claim, since the Act makes "any person who
at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of' liable for all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred by the United States government, as well as other costs
related to the disposal of the hazardous substance. 55 The basic
elements that a plaintiff must demonstrate to prevail on a
CERCLA claim are that (1) the relevant site is a "facility" as
defined by the Act, (2) "a release or threatened release of a
4 See id.
'0 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir.
2005).
r" See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
52 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2000).
53 Id.

4 See 26 U.S.C. § 9507.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (emphasis added).
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hazardous substance has occurred," (3) "the release or threatened
release caused the plaintiff to incur response costs consistent
with the [Act]," and (4) "the defendant is a 'covered person' under
the [Act] .56

This cursory explanation of liability under the statute leaves
unclear how and where corporate liability fits into the statutory
scheme. While the Act's definition of "person" expressly includes
corporations, it is silent about corporate successors.57 Yet there
is no disagreement among the circuit courts that corporate
successor liability exists under CERCLA.58 That conclusion is a
product of statutory construction incorporating the general
provisions of federal law, which provide that the terms
"company" and "association" used in reference to a corporation
include successors. 59 Courts cannot agree, however, on the
proper law to determine successor liability.6 °
The disagreement becomes particularly relevant in the
context of contribution lawsuits. Once a successful suit is
brought under section 9607(a) of the Act, the liable party can
seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607.61 When resolving such
claims, courts may allocate response costs among liable parties
using equitable factors they deem appropriate.62 In many cases,
the liable party has sought contribution from a corporate
successor, but there is uncertainty over whether the applicable
law supports recovery. Basically, the Act seeks to satisfy the
need for expeditious and effective removal of hazardous waste,
while providing cost-spreading mechanisms to hold the
maximum number of responsible parties accountable for cleanup
costs. The cost-spreading mechanisms, however, are generally
only as effective as permitted by the law that is determined to
govern the issue of successor liability.
56 Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496-97 (11th
Cir, 1996).
17 See
42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (defining "person" as "an individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity,
United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of
a State, or any interstate body").
I See United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005).
51 See 1 U.S.C. § 5.
o Watson, supra note 2, at 221.
6' 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
62 Id.
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II.

THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE STATE OF THE LAW

The law of corporate successor liability as applied in the
context of CERCLA has presented problems for many years.63
Depending on the theory of successor liability that a court
chooses to apply, there can be considerable differences in the
characteristics and number of successor corporations that will
come within the purview of the Act. 64 For example, the "mere
continuation" theory of successor liability requires the
satisfaction of certain specific and intricate factors before an
asset purchaser will held liable for the obligations of a seller, but
the "substantial continuation" theory sometimes applied typically
makes it easier to hold a purchaser liable because it involves
consideration of more factors with less detailed requirements. 65
The problem arises when a court chooses to displace the state
successor liability standard in favor of a federal common law
standard, which may be more expansive. As described below,
certain circuit courts have each arrived at a particular theory by
conducting a choice of law analysis in the face of longstanding
principles about the propriety of a federal common law.
A.

From Erie to O'Melveny: General Principlesin Application of
Federal Common Law

It was famously pronounced in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins 66 that "[there is no federal general common law."6 7 If
the choice of law issue were really that simple, however, the
circuit courts would not be in disagreement over which law to
apply to issues of corporate successor liability under CERCLA.
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,8 the Supreme Court
stated that, when Congress has remained silent in an area that
compromises issues substantially related to an established
program of government operation, federal courts are directed to
"fill the interstices" of the federal legislation by applying their
For example, this Note discusses cases addressing corporate successor
liability under CERCLA that date as far back as 1988. See Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988); see also discussion
infra Part II.C.
6 See discussion infra Part III.
6 See discussion infra Part III.B-C.
6 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
61 Id. at 78. The only possible exceptions provided to that principle were those
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress. Id. at 78-79.
68 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
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own standards.69 So despite what Erie seems to stand for, the
Court has determined that the formulation of controlling federal
rules is necessary in the context of certain kinds of federal
programs.7 ° The resultant test inquires as to (1) whether the
nature of the federal program requires uniformity, (2) whether
the application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of
the federal program, and (3) to what extent the application of a
federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships based on
state law.71 If these considerations weigh against the application
of federal law, then state law should be incorporated to govern
the case.72
The three inquiries are each different and distinct, leaving
unanswered the question as to which, if any, merits greater or
lesser weight in the balancing process. In O'Melveny & Myers v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the Court explained that the

second consideration, conflict, should be paramount to the first
consideration, uniformity. 4 The Court very clearly stated that
cases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be
justified are " 'few and restricted'" and are limited to instances in
which a significant conflict exists between federal policy and
state law. 75 "Our cases uniformly require the existence of such a
conflict as a precondition for recognition of a federal rule of
decision."76 The Court also called the federal interest in
uniformity the "most generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged
69 Id. at 727.

'0Id. at 728.
71 See id. at 728-29.
72 See id. at 728.
73 512 U.S. 79 (1994).

In O'Melveny, American Diversified Savings Bank
("ADSB") had engaged in many risky real estate transactions, and its owners had
used sham accounting practices to disguise the bank's dwindling net worth. See id.
at 81. During its representation of ADSB in two real estate syndications, the law
firm O'Melveny & Myers never looked into the bank's financial status. See id. When
federal regulators concluded that ADSB was insolvent, the FDIC stepped in as a
receiver for the bank and soon after began receiving demands from investors who
claimed they were deceived in connection with the real estate syndications. Id. at
81-82. In a suit against the law firm, the FDIC argued that a federal common law
rule should apply to determine whether the knowledge of corporate officers acting
against a corporation's interest will be imputed to the corporation, and also should
apply to determine whether such knowledge by officers should be imputed to the
FDIC when it sues as receiver of the corporation. Id. at 83.
"' See id. at 85-89.

'5Id. at 87 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
76

Id. (emphasis added).
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federal interests."77 Although the Court did not seem to consider
the disruption of commercial relationships a factor, it is at least
apparent that the foremost Kimbell Foods consideration is the
frustration of specific objectives of a federal program and that the
interest in uniformity is more of a supplemental consideration.
Bestfoods: The Supreme Court Passeson the Issue

B.

The closest the Supreme Court has come to addressing the
issue of which law should apply in CERCLA successor liability
cases was United States v. Bestfoods.78 That case involved the
intentional and unintentional dumping of hazardous substances
that began in 1957 and polluted the ground water and soil
around the site of a chemical manufacturing plant in Michigan.7 9
By the time the EPA required cleanup of the site in 1981, the
plant had passed through a number of corporate hands.80 Five
defendants were named as responsible parties, and the trial
focused on the issue of whether two of those defendants, as
parent corporations of the other defendants, had "owned or
operated" the facility within the meaning of the Act. 1
In its discussion of corporate veil-piercing principles, the
Court stated that "CERCLA is thus like many another
congressional enactment in giving no indication that 'the entire
corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a
plaintiffs cause of action is based upon a federal statute.' "82 It
did not directly address successor liability, but the Court
concluded that a parent corporation may be charged with
derivative CERCLA liability for its subsidiary's actions when the
corporate veil may be pierced. The Court also noted "significant
disagreement among courts and commentators" over whether
courts should borrow state law or apply a federal common law of
veil-piercing when enforcing CERCLA's indirect liability.'l It
then declined to further address the issue, finding that it had not
been presented because the parties had not challenged the Sixth

11Id. at 88.
78 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
79 Id. at 56.

1o See id. at 56-58.
81

Id.

82

Id. at 63 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979)).

at 58.

8

Id. at 63-64.

84 Id. at 64 n.9.
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Circuit's determination of derivate liability.8 5 Despite Bestfoods'
seemingly negative dicta about the propriety of using a federal
law standard, at least one lower court has construed Bestfoods as
favoring a federal standard because the Court "applied
'fundamental' and 'hornbook' principles of indirect corporate
liability, not the law of any particular state." 6 The next Subpart,
however, will illustrate that many courts have given due
significance to the language in Bestfoods and have concluded that
state law should apply. There is no foreseeable resolution to this
controversy in light of the Supreme Court's recent denial of
certiorari to review a Third Circuit case clearly holding that a
uniform federal standard should apply in CERCLA successor
liability cases.
C. Circuit Cases in Favorof State Law
The prevalent view in a number of circuits is that there is no
need to displace state law in order to meet the purported federal
interests of CERCLA.
In City Management Corp. v. U.S.
ss
Chemical Co., the Sixth Circuit summarily determined that
Michigan law of successor liability applied in determining
successor corporation liability under CERCLA.8 9 The plaintiff
corporation had acquired the defendant corporation through an
asset purchase and sale agreement which expressly limited the
plaintiffs assumption of hazardous waste liabilities to those
connected with the property where the facility to be purchased
was located. 90 After the execution of the agreement, a group of
corporations involved as "potentially responsible part[ies]" in a
85 Id.
86 United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005). The
Third Circuit contended that, while the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had
applied Michigan Law, the Supreme Court declined to do so and instead looked to
the general rule of veil-piercing. Id.
87 Exide Techs. v. United States, 549 U.S. 941 (2006).
s 43 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994).
9 Id. at 250.
9 See id. at 248. During the course of negotiations between the parties, the
successor corporation had an environmental site investigation conducted regarding
the property where the facility was situated. See id. at 247. The investigation
revealed a significant risk of contamination. Id. Two other consulting firms later
confirmed those findings. See id. Also in the course of negotiations, the predecessor
corporation had received notice from the EPA that it was a potentially responsible
party for up to $44 million in CERCLA liability with respect to dumping at an offsite landfill. See id. It never disclosed this notification to its successor, despite a
subsequent request for information regarding Superfund Sites. See id.
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CERCLA action sought payment from the successor corporation
of its predecessor's exposure to liability at an off-site dumping
location. 91 In turn, the successor corporation sought declaratory
judgment that, as a purchaser of assets, it was not liable as a
successor corporation for any off-site liability arising from presale disposal of hazardous waste at landfills. 92 The district court
held that there was no successor liability because none of the
exceptions had been met to defeat the general rule that a
corporate purchaser of assets is not liable for the corporate
seller's liabilities. 93 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stated that "[a]s
the district court held and all parties ...acknowledge, the
liability of a successor corporation for CERCLA obligations is
determined by reference to state corporation law, rather than
federal common law."9 The district court had stated:
CERCLA does not purport to be a source of authority for
corporate existence and corporate vicarious liability; rather the
act was intended "to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous
waste sites by placing the ultimate financial responsibility for
cleanup on those responsible for the hazardous wastes."
Therefore, CERCLA does not require that federal law displace
state laws governing corporate existence and vicarious liability
unless the state laws permit action prohibited by the ACT [sic],
with the
or unless "their application would be inconsistent
95
federal policy underlying the cause of action."
The circuit court seemed to implicitly approve of the district
court's reasoning, putting it in line with other circuit precedent
holding that state law applies. 96 Previously, in Anspec Co. v.
Johnson Controls, Inc.,9 the Sixth Circuit had concluded that
successor corporations could be held liable under CERCLA, but
specifically found that it was "not necessary to fashion a federal
common law rule."98 It held that the district court should "follow
91 See id. at 247-48. U.S. Chemical's share of the cleanup costs was estimated at
$5.3 million. Id. at 248.
92 See id. at 249.

9 See id. at 250.
94 Id.
95City Envtl., Inc. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 814 F. Supp. 624, 634 (E.D. Mich. 1993),
affd sub nom. City Mgmt. Corp., 43 F.3d 244.
' See City Mgmt. Corp., 43 F.3d at 250.
91922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991).
11 See id. at 1245. The intricate discussion of when it may be appropriate to
adopt a federal common law seemed, however, to be more focused around whether it
would be a creation of federal common law to conclude that corporate successors are
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Michigan law in its application of successor liability."9 9 In his
concurrence, Judge Kennedy explained that state law should
apply based on a belief "that the existence and status of a
'corporation'.. . should be determined by reference to the law
under which the 'corporation' was created" and that as "creatures
of state law ...such questions should be determined by reference
to the law of the state of their incorporation, unless the
10 0
application of that law would conflict with federal policy."
Judge Kennedy also found generalized arguments for uniformity
an insufficient substitute for concrete evidence that adopting
state law would actually affect the federal interests involved
when determining whether application of state law conflicted
with federal policy. 10 Noting the lack of necessity for a federal
common law standard to prevent a state from creating a polluterfriendly environment, Judge Kennedy concluded that there was
no reason to promulgate a uniform federal rule.'0 2
The Eleventh Circuit has also considered the choice-of-law
question, but in the context of a limited liability partnership
case, and concluded that state law should apply. Redwing
Carriers,Inc. v. SaralandApartments0 3 was a contribution suit
brought by a past owner of a parcel of land whose operation of a
trucking terminal caused contamination of the property against a
number of parties that owned, operated, and managed the site at
the time of the suit. 0 4 One of the parties, the Hutton Partners,
became limited partners in the entity that owned the site at the
time of the suit by purchasing a ninety-nine percent interest in
included under the Act, not which law to apply in determining liability. See id. at
1246.
9 Id. at 1248.
100 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
101 Id. at 1250.
102

See id. at 1249-50.

103 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996).
104 See id. at 1494-95. Redwing

Carriers, Inc. had been in the business of
hauling materials used in construction and other industries using trucks that were
cleaned out at the terminal located on the site. Id. at 1494. The waste water from the
cleaning was permitted to drain onto the property, and the ground at the site
became contaminated with hazardous chemicals that formed a tar-like toxic
substance. Id. The property changed hands and an apartment complex was built on
the site. Id. Eventually, the tar began seeping to the surface, and in 1985, Redwing
entered into the first of two consent orders with the EPA agreeing to monitor the
site and to remove any seeps that appeared. Id. at 1494-95. Redwing claimed it
spent $1.9 million investigating and cleaning the site and sought to recoup those
costs by action under sections 113(f) and 107(a) of CERCLA. Id.
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that entity. ' °5 The court considered whether the Hutton Partners
should be deemed "owners" of the site under CERCLA because of
their stake in and power to control the owning entity-an
argument that ran contrary to Alabama law. 10 6 It noted that
"[o]ne of the more significant gaps... arises where the right to
recovery created by the Act confronts state law governing
business entities like corporations and partnerships" and that
"courts have reached different conclusions on whether state or
federal common law provides the rule of decision."107
The Redwing court then applied the Kimbell Foods test to
determine whether federal common law or state law should
govern a limited partner's accountability for the CERCLA
liability of the partnership. 0 8
First, although the court
recognized that a uniform rule would expedite enforcement of the
Act by making liability assessment more certain, it was not
convinced of a need for a uniform rule because that same
argument could be made in the context of almost any federal
statute.0 9 Second, it concluded that the state rules governing the
liability of limited partners would not have conflicted with
CERCLA's goals because they allowed for accountability of
limited liability partners in certain circumstances, and the court
did not anticipate the enactment of more protective statutes "to
defeat CERCLA's goal of having the polluter pay.""1 Finally, the
court recognized the attractiveness of limited partnerships as
investment vehicles and determined that, because the state
limited-partnership statutes defined the extent to which a
partner could manage business without losing limited liability
status, it should not upset the expectations investors have under
the state law rules by adopting a federal common law

105
106
107
100

Id. at 1495.
See id. at 1498.
Id. at 1499-1500.
Id. at 1501.

109 Id. at 1501. The court prudently acknowledged that if convenience in
enforcement justified departure from state law in every case, then the Court in
Kimbell Foods would not have endorsed adopting state law as the federal rule of
decision. See id.

110 See id. at 1501-02.
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standard.1 1 ' After112weighing the factors, it concluded that state
law should apply.
Courts considering the issue after Bestfoods seem even more
likely to decide in favor of state law. In United States v. Davis,"'
the First Circuit considered CERCLA contribution litigation
revolving around disposal of hundreds of thousands of gallons of
hazardous waste at a site that occurred in the late 1970s." 4 The
court considered the choice-of-law question because one of the
liable parties argued that the federal common law standard
5
required its corporate predecessor to be found liable instead."
The court then discussed the traditional "mere continuation test,"
the federal "substantial continuation test,"" 6 and the driving
factors that led other courts to choose one or the other. 1 7 The
First Circuit had concluded almost a decade prior that the
majority rule was to apply state law "so long as it is not hostile to
the federal interests animating CERCLA" in matters of successor
liability.11 The Davis court used the Supreme Court precedent of
111 See id. The court stated that the unsettling effect that a federal rule could
have on relations dependent on state law was the strongest support for adopting the
state law in this case. See id.
112 See id. at 1501-02. The court stated that the "federal law governing liability
under CERCLA should incorporatethe applicable state law rule" and then looked to
Alabama law. Id. at 1502 (emphasis added). This clarifies confusing language found
earlier in the opinion, stating that "federal law determines the issue of CERCLA
liability" and that because "CERCLA is a federal statute targeting a national
problem.., the rights and liabilities created by CERCLA are governed by federal
law." Id. at 1500. The principle of incorporation demonstrated here is treated as the
equivalent of an outright choice of state law for the purposes of this Note because,
logically, it has the same consequence.
113 261 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
114 Id. at 14. In 1970, the owner of ten acres of land in Rhode Island opened a
waste disposal site that was placed on the EPA's National Priorities List of
hazardous waste sites in 1982. Id. at 15. The EPA estimated that the cleanup work
would cost $30 million in total. See id. In 1990, the United States brought an action
against a number of parties for recovery of past and future response expenditures.
See id. at 15-16. One of the defendants, United Technologies Corporation, sued some
of its co-defendants and eighty-eight other companies under the contribution suit
provision of the Act. Id. at 16. The trial court eventually issued a declaratory
judgment in favor of United Technologies and against some of the defendants to the
contribution suit. See id. at 18.
"I

See id. at 52-53.

See generally infra Part III.B-C (providing detailed analysis of the difference
between the two tests).
117 Davis, 261 F.3d at 53. In doing so, the court referred to the Kimbell Foods
test. See id.
118 See id. at 54 (quoting John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 406
(1st Cir. 1993)).
116
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Bestfoods..9 and O'Melveny to reaffirm that position and
concluded that there was no evidence that the application of state
law would frustrate any federal objective. 2 ° The court, therefore,
determined that Connecticut's "mere continuation" test was the
121
correct test to apply.
Some circuits that avoid resolution of the choice-of-law issue
nonetheless take the opportunity to suggest how they might
resolve it in an appropriate case. The Second Circuit did just
that in New York v. National Service Industries, Inc.,122 when it
hinted that it might choose state law over a federal common law
if it were unable to avoid the issue.12' The case involved the
cleanup of a National Priority List contaminated site in New
York where several drums of a hazardous substance used in dry
cleaning had been dumped in 1978.124 The party responsible for
the dumping had sold almost all of its assets to a company that
would later merge into National Services Industries, Inc.
("NSI").1 25 In 1999, the State sued NSI to recover response costs
under CERCLA, asserting that NSI could be held liable because
it fell under the continuity exception to the general rule that a
purchaser corporation is not liable for debts of the seller. 126 The
Second Circuit had previously determined that CERCLA
required a uniform federal rule and that the substantial
continuity test was the appropriate test to apply when
considering that exception. 27 The court, however, rejected the
argument that it was bound by that decision because its rationale
for displacing state law had been overruled by the determination

119 See id. at 54 ("The Court applied state corporation law in a recent CERCLA
case ... and left little room for the creation of a federal rule of liability under the
statute.").
120 See id. The court relied on Bestfoods and O'Melveny for the proposition that
there must be a concrete federal policy that is actually compromised by the
application of state law in order to justify the creation of a federal rule. See id.
121 Id.
122 460 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2006).
121 See id. at 208.
124 Id. at 204.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.; see also B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1996). The
court had held that the substantial continuity test was a CERCLA-specific rule to
displace the narrower and more restrictive state rules concerning asset purchasers
as mere continuations of sellers. See Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 519.
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that the substantial continuity test could not survive Bestfoods.128
After acknowledging the split among circuit courts, the court
stated that the Kimbell factors "appear to favor the
absorption.., of state law" because a mere federal interest in
uniformity is not a sufficient basis for the displacement of state
law.1 29
Ultimately, it declined to decide whether CERCLA
requires the displacement of state law because the State's claim
failed under both New York and traditional common law
principles-but the court did not pass up the opportunity to state
that it failed to see any conflict between the application of state
law and the federal interests at issue in CERCLA 3 °
D. Circuit Cases in Favorof FederalLaw
While there is some stability in temperament among those
circuit courts that favor state law, the courts on the other side of
the issue are considerably more irregular. Some are vehement in
arguing for a uniform federal rule, others provide only dormant
support, and at least one circuit leaves doubt as to whether it has
changed its mind. The Fourth Circuit has not addressed the
issue since it decided United States v. Carolina Transformer
Co.' in 1992. The United States had brought suit under
CERCLA to recover costs incurred decontaminating a site where
dielectric fluid had been spilled or dumped in the course of
salvaging and repairing electronic transformers. 132 The district
court found all of the defendants liable, but one defendant
appealed on the issue of whether it could be held liable for the
original dumping party's acts as its successor-in-interest. 133
Without mentioning Kimbell or any significant weighing of
factors, the Fourth Circuit determined that "[t]he national
interest in the uniform enforcement of CERCLA and the same
interest in preventing evasion by a responsible party by even
legitimate resort to state law are the reasons we think the

128 See Nat'l Serv. Indus., 460 F.3d at 206-07. The court only held that CERCLA
required a uniform rule because it could then adopt the substantial continuity test,
persuaded by the primary concern that some inflexible and easily evaded state law
rules would defeat the goals of the Act. See id. at 207-08.
129 Id.
130 See id. at 208-09.
131 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992).
132 Id. at 834.

133 Id. at 834-35.
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successor liability is appropriate where factually justified."13 4
The court then considered both "'traditional and evolving
principles of federal common law.' "13 It defined the traditional
"mere continuation" exception standard to require that a
corporation not be considered a continuation unless, "after the
transfer of assets, only one corporation remains, and there is
[only one] identity of stock, stockholders, and directors between
the two corporations"-a rule which the court acknowledged
would not be adequate to find the successor corporation liable in
the case. 136
It then considered the eight factors of the
"substantial continuity" approach and was able to conclude that
the district court had not erred in finding the successor
corporation liable. 137 Implicitly, the court seemed to choose the
substantial continuity test over the traditional approach only
because it allowed for a finding of liability.
One of the cases that provided major support for the Fourth
Circuit's position, Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc.,
has
been seriously called into question by a subsequent case from
that same circuit. 139 Louisiana-Pacificwas a Ninth Circuit case
involving the cleanup of log sort yards where heavy metals were
found in ground water and soil resulting from the use of a certain
by-product of copper smelting called "slag."4 ° The owner of the
copper smelter used Industrial Mineral Products ("IMP") to
market and sell the slag to several businesses before it ceased
operations in 1985.141 When the purchasing businesses sued the
owner for cleanup costs under CERCLA, the owner in turn
brought a claim for contribution against the successor-in-interest

134 Id. at 837 (emphasis added). In making this assertion, the court relied on two
decisions favoring a uniform standard from the Ninth and Third Circuits. See id.
The court created some confusion by discussing whether corporate successor liability
exists at all and what standard should apply, without differentiating between those
two distinct issues. See id.
131 Id. (quoting United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988)).
136 Id. at 838. There was no overlap of stock ownership between the two
corporations. Id.
137

Id.

909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d
358, 362 (9th Cir. 1998).
140 Louisiana-PacificCorp., 909 F.2d at 1262. Slag, a hard, rock-like substance,
was commonly used as a ballast to stabilize the grounds at log sort yards. Id.
14 Id. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. was one of the businesses that bought the slag.
138

139
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to IMP. 142 The Ninth Circuit determined that federal law
governed the issue of successor liability under CERCLA based on
considerations of national uniformity.1 4 1 It did not, however,
adopt the broader "continuing business enterprise" approach.'4
Later, in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Brown &
Bryant, Inc., 4 ' the parties asked the Ninth Circuit to use its
"powers" under federal common law to expand corporate
successor liability under CERCLA. 146
The court, however,
declined to embrace the broader notion of substantial
continuation and expressed doubt in its decision in LouisianaPacific before concluding that it need not determine whether
state law instead would control because the same result would be
reached under federal common law. 47
The Ninth Circuit
considered its precedent in light of O'Melveny and recognized
that the Supreme Court had rejected many of the arguments that
Louisiana-Pacific rested on to find a need for uniform federal
rules. 148 It turned to the Kimbell Foods factors and found that,
because state law on successor liability was largely uniform
throughout the country, the alleged "need" for uniformity truly
reflected a desire for a more expansive notion of liability than
state law provided-in essence an attempt to correct perceived
inadequacy in state law on the issue.'4 9 This time, the court did
not seem to perceive any inadequacy, and it found no evidence
See id.
id. at 1263. In so concluding, the court was relying heavily on a case from
the Third Circuit that had been decided two years prior. See id. at 1262-63.
144 See id. at 1265 ("Even were we to adopt the exception, it is inapplicable
here."). The name "continuing business enterprise" is interchangeable with
"substantial continuation."
145 159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1998).
146 Id. at 360. The Railroad parties had leased land to an agricultural chemical
company, and the site eventually was investigated by both state and federal
environmental agencies. Id. The EPA issued an order to the Railroad parties after it
became apparent that their lessee could not complete the cleanup activities itself. Id.
The chemical company sold its business, and the Railroad parties filed a
contribution suit against the purchaser as a successor in interest. Id. at 360-61.
147 See id. at 364. The result would have been the same because the court chose
not to extend the "mere continuation" exception to include the broader concept of
"substantial continuation." Id.
14
Id. at 362.
149 See id. at 363. The court also noted that "while state law on successor
liability is well-developed and uniform, the courts that have attempted to fashion
federal common law rules for successor liability under CERCLA have created
conflicts and uncertainties over a number of issues, including whether to adopt the
expanded 'continuity of enterprise' theory." Id. at 363 n.5.
142

141 See
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that the application of state law would frustrate the objective of
imposing the costs of cleanup on responsible parties or that
states would change their laws just to attract corporate
business.1 5 The Ninth Circuit emphatically rejected the broader
notion of liability, 151 and its blatant shift in view regarding
federal common law is difficult to ignore despite the fact that the
court has not expressly overruled Louisiana-Pacific.5 2
In contrast, the Third Circuit has consistently held that
federal common law governs CERCLA successor liability issues.
In Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.,153 the court
reasoned that successor liability issues must be resolved with
considerations of national uniformity to avoid evasion of
CERCLA goals by responsible parties that arrange for mergers or
consolidations under state laws that are particularly restrictive
of successor liability.5
It also interpreted the little legislative
history available to indicate "that Congress expected the courts
to develop a federal common law to supplement the statute."1 5 It
concluded that the general rule of successor liability in operation
in most states should be decisive as a federal common law
standard rather than the particular state law standard.15 6 After
numerous developments in the law, the Third Circuit
reconsidered the issue in United States v. General Battery
"' See id. at 364.

See id. ("[T]here is no 'substantial continuation' exception in this circuit.").
Courts within the circuit continue to decide successor liability cases under
CERCLA according to the "federal common law" rules. See Cal. Dep't of Toxic
Substances Control v. Cal.-Fresno Inv. Co., No. CV F 06-0488 LJO SMS, 2007 WL
1345580, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2007). But see United States v. Gen. Battery Corp.,
423 F.3d 294, 315 (3d Cir. 2005) (Rendell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[I]t is abundantly clear that the Ninth Circuit, were its hand forced, would
follow the recent directives of the Supreme Court and hold that state law should
govern successor liability under CERCLA.").
'- 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988). The plaintiff land owner was seeking
indemnification from the defendant, as the corporate successor to the company
responsible for the manufacturing of a waste pile that contained asbestos found on
the relevant tract of land. Id. at 87-88.
15' See id. at 92.
1,55Id. at 91. The court did not expand upon this statement, but simply cited to
two district court cases that do not seem to support the proposition. See id.; United
States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 n.8 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. ChemDyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
'56 See Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92. The Third Circuit has also held that the
federal interest in uniform application of CERCLA requires use of federal common
law, not state law, in the context of a parent/subsidiary veil-piercing issue. LansfordCoaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1225 (3d Cir. 1993).
151
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Corp. 157 and provided a detailed explanation for maintaining its
position that federal common law should apply. 5 8 First, it stood
by its precedent and reasoning in Smith Land despite contrary
Supreme Court developments, stating that "[tihe Supreme Court
has neither addressed nor disturbed these holdings." 159 The court
recognized that Bestfoods noted the issue without resolving it
and distinguished O'Melveny as a case brought under a state law
cause of action dealing with the preemptive force of federal
banking statutes.1 60 The Third Circuit suggested that Bestfoods
may actually support the federal common law standard that it
employs-a novel argument based on the belief that the Court
applied "fundamental" and "hornbook" principles of corporate
liability rather than the law of any particular state.161 It also
directly addressed the Atchison argument that state law is
largely uniform by simply contending that there is some variance
and that the resulting unpredictability supports CERCLA
The court praised the more "uniform and
uniformity.162
predictable" federal liability standard for corresponding with
CERCLA objectives by "encouraging settlements and facilitating
a more liquid market" and criticized incorporating "variable and

157 423 F.3d 294. The United States filed an action against Exide Corporation,
alleging that it was responsible for another company's waste disposal as a successor
in interest. Id. at 296. The company manufactured lead acid batteries and had
disposed waste materials at numerous sites that later were found to contain
elevated levels of lead. Id. The EPA concluded that remedial action was necessary,
and the United States incurred response costs of several million dollars. Id.

158 See id. at 298-305.
159 See id. at 298-99.

160 See id. at 299-300. The court also distinguished Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S.
213 (1997), because that case involved the pre-emptive scope of the federal banking
laws. See id. at 300.
161 Id. at 300 ("If anything, Bestfoods cuts in favor of a uniform federal
standard."). The court buttressed this argument by pointing out that other Supreme
Court decisions used general common law principles to fill gaps in federal liability
statutes such as the A.D.A. and Title VII. See id.
162 Id. at 301-02 ("Whether a mixed cash/stock acquisition triggers successor
liability.., does not command uniform treatment among the states .... New
Jersey corporations may be held responsible for successor environmental liability
from which New York corporations may be exempt.").
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uncertain" state standards for increasing CERCLA litigation and
transaction costs. 163 The court concluded:
To summarize, the Supreme Court has neither overruled nor
directly undermined Smith Land. Furthermore, a uniform
federal standard is appropriate under Kimbell Foods and
O'Melveny: (1) the nature of the federal program, a
comprehensive federal liability statute, counsels in favor of
national uniformity; (2) a uniform successor liability standard is
necessary to advance CERCLA's remedial objectives and to
facilitate a fluid market in corporate and brownfield assets; and
(3) uniform application of the majority state standard accords
proper respect to commercial relationships predicated on the
majority state law. Therefore, we will apply "the general
64
doctrine of successor liability in operation in most states."
The court, however, did acknowledge Bestfoods' holding that
CERCLA does not abrogate fundamental common law principles
of corporate liability and agreed that "substantial continuity" is
therefore an untenable basis for successor liability. 16 1
The
6
6
Supreme Court has decided not to review the case.
Is the Third Circuit really the "last man standing" for federal
common law?
A recent Eighth Circuit case may indicate
otherwise. The Eighth Circuit had determined in United States
v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co. 67 that the district court was "probably
correct in applying federal law," 6 8 and further discussed and

1"

See

id. at 302-03.

The

court

referred

to

"statutory interests

in

42 U.S.C. § 9622, which aims to encourage early settlements, and in § 9607(r), which
aims to facilitate a liquid market in brownfield assets." Id. at 303.
16 Id. at 303-04 (quoting Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.,
851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1988)). But see id. at 309 (Rendell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("This determination is unnecessary to the resolution of the
issues before us and runs counter to recent Supreme Court pronouncements which
both call into question the concept of federal common law and explicitly state that
only in the most limited of circumstances should we look beyond applicable state
law.").
166 Id. at 309 (majority opinion).
166 Exide Techs. v. United States, 549 U.S. 941 (2006) (denying petition for writ
of certiorari).
167 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992). The case involved a parcel of land that had been
contaminated with hazardous substances called "PCBs" during the operations of a
waste oil hauling company. Id. at 482-83. The EPA cleaned up the site and sued a
number of parties to recover costs, including the corporate successor to the waste oil
hauling company. Id. at 483.
166 Id.
at 487 n.9. The court stated that it did not decide whether federal or state
law should apply because the parties had not raised the issue. Id.
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endorsed the "substantial continuation" theory.1 69 It stated that
the cases applying this theory "correctly focused on preventing
those responsible for the wastes from evading liability through
the structure of subsequent transactions. "170 Since CERCLA is
aimed at imposing costs on responsible parties, the court
reasoned that "the imposition of successor liability under the
'substantial continuation' test is justified by a showing that in
substance, if not in form, the successor is a responsible party."1 71
The court then continued its analysis under the "substantial
continuation" theory. 172 In KC. 1986 Ltd. Partnershipv. Reade
Manufacturing,'73 the court discussed its conclusion from Mexico
Feed & Seed that "the policy objectives of CERCLA would justify
imposing successor liability.., under the broader standard by
extending liability to a successor corporation which ... had
acquired assets 'with knowledge that the wrong remains
unremedied.' ",174 It also acknowledged that the continuing
viability of the "substantial continuation" theory was seriously
called into doubt by the Supreme Court in Bestfoods and that
other circuits were abandoning the theory.175
Ultimately,
however, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "there may yet be
contexts in which the substantial continu[ation] test could
survive" because Bestfoods did not directly address corporate
successor liability and that it need not decide if the theory is still
176
viable because the facts of the case would not satisfy it anyway.
The court again stated that it would not decide whether CERCLA
requires the displacement of state law in favor of a national rule
of successor liability,1 77 although the court's insistence that it has
not decided this issue is odd considering its endorsement and
application of the "substantial continuation" test-which it
acknowledges was "originally created by federal courts."178

169
170
171

See id. at 487-90.
Id. at 488.
Id.

172 See id. at 489-90.

472 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1021 (quoting Mexico Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 488 (emphasis
omitted)).
175 See id. at 1022.
176 See id.
177 Id. at 1025 n.4. There was no assertion that the state corporation law would
be any different from traditional common law principles. Id.
173
174

178 See id. at 1021.
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Nonetheless, this practice of courts to sidestep the issue seems to
be quite common in this context.
This Part has demonstrated just how convoluted the issue
has become. Given the temporal length of the disagreement, the
number of circuits involved, and the uncertainty the split is
creating for corporate practitioners and parties seeking to recoup
costs under the Act, it is almost surprising that the Supreme
Court has declined to squarely address the issue and grant
certiorari to review General Battery. KC. 1986 Ltd. Partnership
is a clear demonstration that courts will continue to skirt the
issue and perpetuate diverging viewpoints that have a tendency
to further impede the already long process of CERCLA recovery.
The issue is far from being resolved in the courts, but the next
two Parts suggest an approach that can provide some stability for
practitioners and parties seeking to recover under the Act.
III. "MERE" AND "SUBSTANTIAL" CONTINUITY
It is difficult to soundly contend that there is any material
need to apply a federal common law standard over the relevant
state law standard in decisions of corporate successor liability. A
comparison of the different standards makes it clear that
applying a federal standard accomplishes either a minimal
appreciable difference in result, or an unprecedented and
capricious alteration of settled corporate law principles without
adequate justification. The divergence lies in which "federal
standard" the court chooses to apply-the traditional common
law "mere continuation" theory or the "substantial continuation"
theory spawned from federal law and not widely accepted among
states. Each of these theories operates as an exception to the
general rule against liability, but one is considerably broader
than the other.
A.

CorporateSuccessors:A Roadmap of Liability
A tactic often employed by corporations seeking to avoid
liability is acquisition of the other corporation's assets instead of
its shares. 179 A corporation that purchases the assets of another

179 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 37, at 112. After a sale of a corporation's stock, the
liabilities of the corporation remain with the corporation despite any change in
ownership. See Kenneth K. Kilbert, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: Whither
Substantial Continuity?, 14 PENN ST. ENvTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
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corporation typically does not become liable for the obligations of
the seller by virtue of the asset transaction alone, but it will be
held liable:
(1) where the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly
agrees to assume the selling corporation's liabilities; (2) where
the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the two
corporations; (3) where the purchasing corporation is a mere
continuation of the selling corporation; [or] (4) where the
transaction is entered into fraudulently, in order
to escape
80
liability for obligations of the selling corporation.
So, the general rule that an asset purchaser does not become
liable for the obligations of the seller is subject to four exceptions
by which liability may be imposed. This is the overarching
principle that serves as the backdrop for the ensuing debate. The
divergence occurs as a function of the third exception, which is
focused around the concept of continuity.
B.

The "Mere Continuation"Theory

Most states articulate the "mere continuation" standard as a
consideration of some form of the following factors: (1) the
divesting corporation's transfer of assets; (2) payment of less
than fair market value by the buyer for the assets;
(3) continuation by the buyer of the divesting corporation's
business; (4) a common officer of the buyer and divesting
corporations who was instrumental in the transfer; and (5) the
inability of the divesting corporation to pay its debts after the
transfer. 8 1
"[C]ommon identity of officers, directors, and
stockholders... is the key element" of this standard. 182 The
mere continuation standard would be used both in circuits that
apply the law of a particular state subscribing to the popular
approach and in circuits that apply a federal common law
83
standard based on the law generally applicable in most states.
180City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 1994); see also
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 361
(9th Cir. 1998).
18" See United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 53 (1st Cir. 2001).
182 Kilbert, supra note 179, at 6.
183 See, e.g., Atchison, 159 F.3d at 362, 364 ("[We choose not to extend the 'mere
continuation' exception to include the broader notion of a 'substantial continuation.'
Louisiana-Pacific recognized that 'the traditional rules of successor liability in
operation in most states' should determine the limits of CERCLA successor
liability."); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d
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At least one scholar has identified various "species" of mere
The differences
continuation applied throughout states."
between the "species" lie in whether the state has taken an
elemental bright-line approach, a threshold approach with
consideration of other non-dispositive factors, a flexible nondispositive factor approach, or an undefined approach."' 5
Nonetheless, this slight variation does not affect the general
stringent characteristic of mere continuity because a common
identity of shareholders, directors, or officers is presumably
8 6 There still would
always a prominent feature of the standard."
be little difference in the ultimate outcome if a court chose to
adopt some form of this standard as a "federal standard" as long
as it is substantially the same as the state law standard to be
displaced.
C.

The "SubstantialContinuation"Theory

A real discrepancy between state and federal law
outcomes theoretically would occur if a court chose to incorporate
the "substantial continuation" standard as the federal
continuity rule. The substantial continuation standard requires
consideration of eight factors:
(1) retention of the same employees; (2) retention of the same
supervisory personnel; (3) retention of the same production
facilities in the same location; (4) production of the same
product; (5) retention of the same name; (6) continuity of assets;
(7) continuity of general business operations; and (8) whether
the [buyer] holds itself out as a continuation of the previous
enterprise. 187

Cir. 1988) ("The general doctrine of successor liability in operation in most states
should guide the court's decision rather than the excessively narrow statutes which
might apply in only a few states."); Nelson, supra note 1, at 534
("Several... circuits.., read CERCLA to incorporate 'general' law on this point;
they determine successor liability under CERCLA according to '[tihe general
doctrine of successor liability in operation in most states ....'" (quoting Smith Land

& Improvement Corp., 851 F.2d at 92)).
184 See George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6
FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 9,32-34 (2007) [hereinafter Taxonomy].
188 See id.

1'6 See id. at 35.
187 United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992);
see also United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 53 (1st Cir. 2001); MOSKOWITZ, supra
note 37, at 115.
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By increasing the number of relevant factors and decreasing the
complexity of each factor, the circuits adopting this broader
federal common law approach make it easier to recover from a
corporate successor. For example, the substantial continuation
test does not require continuity of shareholders or directors or
officers between the predecessor corporation and the successoran element that is considered one of the more dispositive factors
under the mere continuation test. 88 Some courts have noted that
altering the traditional "mere continuation" exception to
encompass the broader "substantial continuation" exception in
order to hold an asset purchaser liable may actually be
unnecessary because in many cases where the traditional
exception cannot be met there has been some fraudulent intent
or collusion, making the corporation liable under the fourth
exception to the traditional rule-that the transaction was
entered into fraudulently to escape liability for selling
18 9
corporation's obligations.
Ultimately, a federal court deciding that a federal standard
should determine issues of corporate successor liability under
CERCLA might choose to incorporate either the "mere
continuation" or the "substantial continuation" exception to the
general rule against liability. The basic effect of these exceptions
is that a successor is "more likely to be held liable for the
CERCLA liability of its predecessor as it becomes more closely
identified with that predecessor,"1' 9 although the substantial
continuation exception casts a wider net of liability. Any given
state's continuity test could range from a basic standard of "mere
continuation" to the more expansive "substantial continuity. " 191
A court seeking maximum liability from successors in a state
that embraces the "mere continuation" theory might look to hold
in favor of a federal standard and then incorporate the
"substantial continuity" theory as a means to reach that goal.
Before making such a departure from settled state principles of
corporate law, however, it is necessary to consider whether it is
"" See Kilbert, supra note 179, at 7; Taxonomy, supra note 184, at 31.
189 See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d
358, 364 (9th Cir. 1998).
190 WHITMAN, supra note 28, § 5.03, at 151-52.
191 See generally Taxonomy, supra note 184, at 62-148 (discussing different
variations on successor liability standards from state to state). Typically, states do
not use standards that restrict liability further than it is under the traditional mere
continuation exception. See id.
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justifiable-or even necessary-to advocate and employ either
federal standard.
IV.

STATE LAW V. FEDERAL LAW: THE RESOLUTION

The Kimbell Foods factors that guide the application of
federal law take into account three basic considerations: (1) need
for uniformity; (2) frustration of specific federal objectives; and
(3) disruption of commercial relationships.'9 2 O'Melveny states
that the second consideration is paramount as a precondition to
the others. 193 A walk through the arguments for either side as
they relate to these factors leads to the inevitable conclusion that
irrefutable support for a federal common law standard of
CERCLA successor liability cannot be found in the guidelines the
Supreme Court has set for applying federal law.
Disruption of Commercial Relationships
As a number of courts have recognized, courts should be
hesitant to displace state law in favor of a federal standard
because corporations and investors often rely on the state law of
incorporation in making business decisions.' 9 4 This argument
finds its place in the third Kimbell Foods factor-the extent to
which the application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial
relationships based on state law.' 95 Since the line of cases
descending from Erie generally favors the application of state law
in most situations, 9 6 the consideration of the interests behind
state law is more relevant once a court has found that there is
some reason to displace state law in favor of a federal common
law rule. In most cases, the interests supporting a federal

A.

192 See supra Part II.A.
193 See supra Part II.A.
194 See United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005)

(citing Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 105 (1991)); Redwing
Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1502 (11th Cir. 1996).
19' See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979); see
also Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1502 (analyzing the third Kimbell Foods factor
and reasoning that the potential to upset the expectations of investors under state
law rules is the strongest support for adopting state law).
196 See Rodney B. Griffith & Thomas M. Goutman, A Hiccup in Federal Common
Law Jurisprudence: Sosa, Bestfoods and the Supreme Court's Restraints on
Development of Federal Rules of CorporateLiability, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 359,
360 (2006).
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common law rule are likely to be considered first and are
therefore pivotal-and typically more controversial.
B.

The "Need" for Uniformity

A general need for uniformity cannot be adequate
justification to invoke a federal standard. The federal interest in
uniformity, however, is the principal-and sometimes the onlyinterest invoked to support the argument that federal law should
apply. 9 7 Although a federal uniform standard logically would
increase certainty in application and decrease litigation and
transaction costs, these considerations do not rise to the level of a
"conflict" as required by O'Melveny. 9 s Considering that the
traditional federal rule is derived from the law in place in the
majority of states, it cannot be explained rationally how any
significant frustration will occur from applying one rule over the
other.' 99 State law does not vary widely on the issue of successor
liability.2 00 The only rule that would produce a different result
across the board is the "substantial continuation" approach, 20 1 a
rule that has been recognized as an untenable basis for successor
22
liability after Bestfoods. 1
The "need for uniformity" is not about a patchwork of state
laws that is currently in disarray, but can only be about the
desire to apply the broader substantial continuity standard to
reach more corporate successors than can be held liable under
state law as it stands.2 3 The motivation is therefore a concern of
197

See, e.g., General Battery, 423 F.3d at 301-02; La.-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc.,

909 F.2d 1260, 1263 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990).
19' See General Battery, 423 F.3d at 310-12 (Rendell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc.,
159 F.3d 358, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1997).
199 See Watson, supra note 2, at 234 (recognizing the homogeneity between
federal and state law).
200 See generally Taxonomy, supra note 184, at 62-148 (providing a compilation
of relevant judge-made successor liability laws for each state in the appendix).
201 See Watson, supra note 2, at 233-34 (stating that the broader "substantial
continuity" test allowed courts to hold more parties liable under CERCLA, and since
courts have moved away from the broader approach, federal common law and state
law are one and the same).
202 General Battery, 423 F.3d
at 309; see also JOEL S. MOSKOWITZ,
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS 76 (2d ed. Supp.
2008) (noting that several courts of appeal have concluded that the substantial
continuity theory of successor liability did not survive Bestfoods).
202 See General Battery, 423 F.3d at 314 (Rendell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

2009]

MAKING IT A FEDERAL ISSUE

inadequacy, not conflict. 0 4
The courts should be wary of
embracing federal common law rules using a pretext of
"uniformity" whenever the widely accepted laws of the states
merely seem inadequate. If no significant conflict appears, then
the laws are adequate enough under current Supreme Court
precedents and should not be displaced.
By reducing the
standard for displacement of state law from conflict with an
important federal policy to a mere need for uniformity, courts
would create the potential for a body of federal common law to be
developed around virtually every federal act.20 5
C.

Conflict: The Frustrationof Specific FederalObjectives

There is no support for the argument that application of
state law would rise to the level of conflict with federal goals
because states typically do not employ restrictive standards that
would frustrate the specific federal objectives of CERCLA. Since
states have an interest in protecting their land and the wellbeing of their citizens, they will not create a law to make
themselves particularly hospitable places for polluters.2 6 That
sound argument illustrates the negligible probability of conflict
between a specific state law and the objectives of CERCLA and
the lack of real need to abrogate a state's chosen standard. The
best attempt by a circuit to meet the conflict standard was the
argument that variable and uncertain state successor liability
204 See New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 2006)
(recognizing that the court had only held in favor of a uniform federal rule so it could
adopt the substantial continuity test to bypass state laws that were "easily evaded"
and that its original rationale for displacing state law had been overruled after
Bestfoods); General Battery, 423 F.3d at 314.
205 See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501 (11th
Cir. 1996) (noting that, although adopting a uniform rule has the potential to
expedite CERCLA enforcement by decreasing uncertainty in assessing liability, the
argument is not unique to CERCLA and could be made for just about any federal
statute).
206 See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d
358, 364 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that states have their own interest preventing
successor corporations from evading liability and that it is unrealistic to think that a
state would alter general corporate law principles-developed to address much more
than environmental liability-simply to become hospitable to polluters); Anspec Co.
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("States have a substantial interest in protecting their citizens and state
resources. Most states... share a complementary interest ... in enforcement of
laws ... used to remedy environmental contamination. I see no necessity to create
federal common law.., to guard against the risk that states will create safe havens
for polluters.").
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standards taken altogether would increase CERCLA litigation
and transaction costs, creating conflict with certain statutory
interests in encouraging settlements and facilitating a liquid
market. 20 7
This hybrid position uses the alleged lack of
uniformity as a basis for a conflict with statutory objectives.
There are two things inherently wrong with this argument.
First, the second consideration of Kimbell Foods and the conflict
standard from O'Melveny should not involve evaluation of "the
jurisprudential landscape of all fifty states."20 Rather, a court
should only consider whether "the particularstate law in question
20 9
is inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal statute."
This clarification obliterates any argument of conflict with
statutory aims of decreasing litigation and encouraging
settlements due to variance because the court should only
properly consider the effect of the law of one state, making
variation among states irrelevant. The danger in this argument
lies in the attempt to dovetail the first and second Kimbell Foods
factors, which are separate and distinct. Allowing lack of
uniformity to be the basis of conflict has the potential to
completely subvert the rationale behind the holding of O'Melveny
that conflict is a precondition to the creation of federal law.2 10
The second fault in this argument, which relates to the rationale
behind O'Melveny, is that it could be made for a large percentage
of federal statutes-taking the number of instances from few and
restricted to vast and limitless.
Decreasing litigation and
encouraging settlements is presumably always a federal interest,
and is dissimilar to the instances that the Supreme Court has
detailed as the "few and restricted" cases in which it created a
If decreased litigation could be a
federal common law.2 1'
paramount concern, uniform federal standards would be the

See General Battery, 423 F.3d at 302-03.
See id. at 312 (Rendell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 111 (1991)).
See id. at 317-18 ("To say that the need for uniformity is the articulated
federal policy supplying the rationale for creating federal common law is to put the
analytic rabbit in the hat, so to speak.").
211 See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 225-26 (1997) (listing controversy
between two states regarding apportionment of streamwater, federal government
contractors and civil liability of federal officials, relationship between Federal
Government and members of its armed forces, liability of federal officials in the
course of official duty, and relationships with other countries).
207

208
209
210
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norm as predictability would almost always be lacking in every
case due to even the slightest variation in law from state to state.
D. Beyond Kimbell-CongressionalIntent
Courts deciding in favor of federal common law in these
cases have desperately attempted to supplement a weak Kimbell
analysis with the argument that Congress expected courts to
develop federal rules to supplement the statute.2 12 Taking a first
look at whether there has been a congressional directive for
federal judges to develop their own rules is indeed a wellrecognized approach.21 3 Speculation that such a directive exists
here, however, is completely unwarranted, especially in light of
the scant legislative history of the Act.214 The Supreme Court
has made clear that, when dealing with comprehensive and
detailed federal statutes, courts should presume that anything
left unaddressed in the statutory scheme is subject to state
law.2 1 Although CERCLA has been criticized for its less than
optimal draftsmanship, the Act is nonetheless comprehensive,21 6
and it does specifically address the law that should apply in other
instances.2 17 Considering the lack of a clear directive from
Congress and the comprehensive nature of the statute, the
position that Congress expected courts to create federal common
law to cover successor liability under CERCLA is completely
untenable. CERCLA is wholly silent about successor liability,
and courts should be hesitant to infer anything contrary to state
218
law.
See General Battery, 423 F.3d at 299.
See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d
358, 362 (9th Cir. 1998).
214 See id.
215 See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994); Atchison, 159 F.3d
at 362.
21' The very first letter in the acronym "CERCLA" stands for "comprehensive."
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000 & Supp. I). That seems to be a clear indication that
Congress viewed the statute as such. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55
212
213

(1998) ("As its name implies, CERCLA is a comprehensive statute. . . ." (quoting

Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994))).
217 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(C) (2000) ("Any contribution action brought
under this paragraph shall be governed by Federal law.").
218 See Nelson, supra note 1, at 558 n.265 ("[Clourts should resist the idea that
because 1 U.S.C. § 5 expresses a generic intention to include 'successors and assigns'
whenever Congress uses the word 'association' in reference to a corporation, federal
statutes that impose liability on 'associations' . . . are thereby federalizing questions
of successor liability.").
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State Law: The Right Choice

State law should apply when deciding issues of corporate
successor liability under CERCLA. When the law of that
particular state creates no clear conflict with the objectives of the
Act and adequately provides for the cleanup and cost distribution
that the Act is meant to perpetuate, then that law should
determine whether the successor can be held liable. That is the
only conclusion that can withstand Kimbell analysis and other
jurisprudential considerations.219 If there is an actual conflict
between specific federal objectives found in CERCLA and the law
of a particular state, then the court may permissibly choose to
apply the rule of law generally applicable in most states. The
conclusion that relevant state law should apply is not defeated by
the argument that predictability will be lacking without a
uniform federal standard. Uniformity is but one issue to
consider, with greater emphasis falling on the more restrictive
standard of significant conflict required by O'Melveny. Under the
significant conflict standard, only the law of the particular state
is relevant and variance among many states is not a proper
consideration.
If the law of the particular state does conflict with CERCLA
objectives, then courts should look to the traditional mere
continuation exception because it is the applicable rule in most
states. 22 0

There is no support, however, for applying the

substantial continuation exception as a federal rule after the
Court's statement in Bestfoods against replacement of the
"'entire corpus of state corporation law'" simply because the
cause of action is based on CERCLA. 221

Application of that

standard as a federal rule would both fail to show deference to
the state's chosen standard and disrupt the commercial
219 See supra Part IV.A-D.
220 See Taxonomy, supra note 184, at 35 (describing the mere continuation

exception as "traditional and long standing"); see also supra note 183 and
accompanying text. But see Kilbert, supra note 179, at 20 ("[O]nce it is determined
that a uniform federal common law should apply, federal courts have fairly broad
latitude .... It is not.., an exercise in weighing which particular test is most
widely established in the federal or state common law. If majority rule were the lone
criterion, the first courts deciding an issue would set and fix the course of federal
common law forever ....
While this approach might result in uniformity, uniformity
for uniformity's sake is not the purpose of federal common law.").
221 See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478
(1979)).
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relationships based on that state law.
The only time the
substantial continuation test should be applied is when it is the
chosen standard of the particular state.2 22 Some may contend
that defaulting to state law unless conflict exists will lead to
increased litigation and transaction costs because parties will
always argue that the law of the particular state conflicts with
CERCLA objectives. Such frivolous suits would be unlikely and
impractical, however, because the vast uniformity of state
corporation law would lead to widely applicable precedents.
Moreover, the fact that the state law is the law that is
contemplated by the parties when making business decisions
would make any argument of unexpected consequences from its
application untenable.
CONCLUSION

The environmental harms that CERCLA is aimed to correct
and prevent are arguably among the most important issues
facing society today. The goal of having the responsible party
pay is indeed very admirable. There is no need, however, to
make corporate successor law a "federal issue." Individual states
have the same strong interest to protect their citizens and
resources and they fashion their corporate responsibility laws
accordingly.
Supreme Court jurisprudence advises against
displacing state law without a concrete federal policy that would
be defeated by applying a state law.
When courts are faced with the issue of corporate successor
liability under CERCLA, they first should ask whether the
particular state law significantly conflicts with any federal policy
or objective embodied in CERCLA. If not, the law of that state
should apply. Only when a significant conflict can be found
should the courts resort to the application of a "federal"
standard-the traditional mere continuation exception derived
from the law of most states. The law of the state, however,
should always be the default choice of law.

Some states, like New York, seem to have adopted the more expansive
substantial continuation test. See George W. Kuney, Successor Liability in New
York, N.Y. ST. B.J., Sept. 2007, at 22, 24-25. As this Note has already demonstrated,
that choice by certain states and not others does not support the application of a
federal standard in every case because need for uniformity alone is not a proper
basis to argue for a federal rule.
2
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